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A representative of the lrtah Department of 
Employment Security issued determinations to the 
appellants denying then1 unen1ployment compensation 
benefits for an indefinite period beginning August 13, 
1961, on the grounds that their unen1ployment was due 
to a stoppage of "rork which existed because of a strike 
involving their grade, class, or group of workers at the 
factory or establishment where they were last employed. 
Timely appeal was made to the Appeals Referee who 
on September 21, 1961, conducted a hearing and who 
on the 27th day of September, 1961, affirmed the deci-
sion of the Department representative. On October 4, 
1961, the decision of the Appeals Referee was appealed 
to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah. On the 5th day of December, 1961, the Board 
of Review issued a decision affirming the decision of 
the Referee and the representatiYe. The matter is now 
before this Court by reason of a Petition for ''Trit of 
Review which \vas filed on the 28th day of December, 
1961. 
ST.1i'l,EMENT OF FACTS 
To the appellants' ''STArJ~EMENT OF FACTS" 
must be added the follo,ving: As of 7:00A.M. on Aug-
ust 17, 1961, the Kennecott Copper Corporation, l_Ttah 
Copper DiYision, did all those things consistent with 
the continuance of normal operations at the mine. ''T ork 
schedules were posted, electric power was ayailable, 
foren1en had been instructed to put all men to \vork 
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\vho reported for 'vork, n1en 'vho reported for ,vork 
\vere given their reg·ular assignments, and there \vas 
\vork for those \\' ho chose to work, and substantial oper-
ations at the mine came to a halt only when the great 
1najority of the members of the appellant groups did 
not report for work as scheduled and, therefore, failed 
to be available for their regular assignments. 
Srl,ArfEMEN'l' o~~ POIN'l,S 
1 rrHE ~-,INDINGS o~~ }1~AC'l, 0}1_, rl,HE 
APPEALS REFEREE AS AFFIRMED BY 
rrHE BOARD OF, REVIE"T WHICH ARE 
CLAIMED TO BE IN ERROR IN APPEL-
LANT'S POINTS OF A R GUM E N T 1 
'l,HROUGH 3 ARE SUPPORTED BY EVI-
DENCE AND ARE, THERF~lTORE, CONCLl~­
SIVE. 
2. THE CLAIMAN'l'S REPRESENri'ED BY 
THE SUBJECT IJOCAIJ UNIONS P AR'fiCI-
PATED IN THE STRIKE OF, THE ELECTRI-
CAL WORKERS UNION OF AUGUST 17, 
1961, BY CONCERTED "\JVI'fHHOLDING 01~ 
THEIR SERVICES. 
3. THE UNEMPLOYM}~Nrr OF T H E 
CLAIMANTS "WAS DlJE TO A STOPPAGE 
OF 'VORK ''THJC,JI EXISTED BECAUSE OF 
A STRIKE IN,TOL VING rrHEIR GRADE. 
CLASS, OR GROUJ:> OF 'VORI(ERS AT THE 
)liNE. 
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All-GUMENT 
POIN'f ONE 
1 ,_l,HE ~liNDlNGS O:F' J:1,AC'l~ 0~-, THE 
APPEALS REF,EREE AS AFFIRMED BY 
1"HE BOARD OF, RE,TIE'V \'\THICH ARE 
CLAIMED TO BE IN ERROR IN APPEL-
LAN1"'S POINTS OF A R GUM E NT 1 
'fHROUGH 3 ARE SUPPORTED BY E'TI-
DENCE AND AR}~, THEREFORE, CONCLU-
SIVE. 
Section 35-4-10 (i) ~ Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
second paragraph, provides in part: 
" ... In any judicial proceeding under this 
section the findings of the Commission and the 
Board of Review as to the facts if supported by 
evidence shall be conclusive and the jurisdiction 
of said court shall be confined to questions of 
l '' aw ... 
This Court, follo"ring a long line of work-
men's compensation cases involving similar language, 
has consistently from time to -time ruled that where the 
findings of the Commission and Board of Review are 
supported by e\ridence they 'vill not be disturbed. See 
Ralph E. Child YS. Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Department of Employment Se-
curity~ 332 P. 2d 928, 8 Utah 2d 239; Creameries of 
America, Inc. Ys. The Industrial Commission of Utah 
and Robert L. ~-,oss, 102 P. 2d 300, 98 Utah 36~ Em-
ployees of Lion c.oal Corporation at ''T attis, Utah YS. 
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'fhe 1 nd us trial l'l <>Ininission of lJ tah and the Lion Coal 
Corporation, Ill I>. 2d 797, 100 lJtah 207; 'I'ea1nsters, 
c,hauffeurs anti I-Ielpers of .i-~erica YS. Orange 'l,rans-
portation Con1pany, 296 P. 2d 291, 5 Utah ~d. 4.). See 
also Outboard ~Iarine and _Jianufacturing l'ompany 
vs. Gordon, 403 Ill. 518, 87 N.E. 2d 619, in 'vhich the 
Supreme Court said that it would not disturb findings 
of fact of an administrative agency unless they are 
manifestly against the weight of evidence or unless 
there is no evidence to support them. See also Stillman 
vs. lloard of Review, 161 Pa. Super 569, 56 A. id 380, 
in which the Court held that it could not disturb find-
ings of fact of the unemployment compensation Board 
of Revie'v where they \Vere supported by evidence even 
though the record may contain other competent evi-
dence which, had it been accepted by the Board, \Vould 
have justified different findings, nor may the Superior 
Court substitute its findings for those of the Board. 
Before we discuss the evidence and testimony 
"Thich support the findings, we wish to point out that 
the record contains a stipulation of parties that the 
Kennecott Copper Corporation, Utah Copper Divi-
sion, in Utah is an integrated operation. Therefore, 
the question of whether or not it is so integrated merits 
no argument on our part. 
'fhe findings that appellants 'vithheld their services 
are a1nply supported by· the stipulation of parties (R 
0047) that for the most part the workers represented by 
the unions to which the appellants belonged did not re-
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port for work on the shift commencing at 7:00 A.M., 
August 17, 1961. Witnesses for the appellants sup-
ported the stipulation as follows: 
Testimony of ~Ir. Bentley (R 0070): 
A_nswer: "'ro my knowledge there were very 
few people who went through the picket lines." 
(R 0068) 
Answer: '' ... There were some individuals 
who come and asked for passes. 
Question: ''Did you give them passes? 
Answer: "We told them we're on strike and 
we are advertising· that we are on strike and that 
the purpose, that's the only legal thing we've got 
is to advertise "re're on strike-a picket line ad-
vertises that you're on strike and we'd like every-
body to abide by it." 
Next, testin1ony of Mr. Flores ( R 0073) : 
Question: "'Vhy didn't you work? 
Ans,ver: "Because I called my boss that morn-
ing 'vhen I heard there was a strike and asked 
if I'd go to 'vork that day and he said that the 
day shift hadn't reported for work and he says 
if the strike isn't settled by 3 :30 he says you 
won't be able to 'vork either." (The day shift 
was the one starting at 7:00 A.M., August 17, 
1961.) 
Testimony of l\fr. 'Veidner. He testified (R 0074, 
R 0075) that he sa'" pickets at the tunnel and the pre-
cipitation plant and decided to go home. He then testi-
fied as foll(n,·s at R 0076: 
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Question: "'NO\\·, .Ylr. \\r eidner, \"OU testified 
that you "·orked on the records of the precipita-
tion plant . 
.1\.ns,ver: ~-'.rhat's right. 
Question: "As a matter of fact the precipita-
tion plant operated during the strike, didn't it 1 
i\.nswer: ''I found that out, yes. 
Question: ~'Do you recall the company asking 
the union to furnish some clerks to do some 
clerical "'ork after the strike started? 
Answer: ""Will you state that again? 
Question: "Do you recall a request coming· 
from the company to the ur1ion for some clerks 
to 'vork after the strike started? After the strike 
was going? 
Answer: "Just clerks? 
Question: "Yes. 
Answer: "Yes. 
Question: "Do you know what disposition was 
made of that reqtiest? 
Ans,ver: "None of them worked." 
Testimony of ~Ir. Larsen (R 0078): 
Answer: "I started to work. I went as usual 
and caught the work bus and rode up to the bus. 
'V e went up and got in the Bingham bus in the 
jam. ,-fhe bus turned around and said they were 
going back do,vn out of the jam, so I rode it 
back down and then I went home at that time.'' 
(R 0079) 
Question: "Jir. Larsen, prior to 7:30 or 8:00 
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o'clock, did you have any discussion with anyone 
about work? 
Answer: "No, we didn't. In fact we didn't 
really think there would be a strike. We had 
heard rumors and one thing and another, but 
we didn't know anything about it until we got 
up to the picket line. In fact, we were quite sur-
prised about it." 
Next, testimony of Mr. Rawlings (R 0080): 
Question: "Did you go to work that day? 
Answer: "I went with the anticipation of go-
ing but we \\rere stopped just below the tram 
due to the congestion and we turned around and 
parked and "raited arolmd there oh, possibly 
for maybe an hour and we didn't see 1nuch activ-
ity so 've turned around and went home." 
Testimony of l\Ir. Goris (R 0084): 
Answer: ''You have to understand here that a 
country road leads to the entrance to the ma-
chine shop, ifs on a hill, and the pickets were 
established at the bottom of the hill. 
Question: ''rfhere 'vere a few fellows down at 
the bottom of the hill and you didn't get up above 
there, did you? 
A "N " ns,ver: o. 
'festitnony of ~\Ir. (jayth"\\raite (R 0089) : 
Question: '' ... did any of the members of 
your local \vork after 7:00 a.m. on August 17? 
Answer: "Yes. 
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Question: ·~'!'here \vere about nine that \vorked 
one or t\vo days. 
1\.nswer: '~One day, I think." 
(It 0091) 
'l'he '"'itness testifies: 
Answer: "No, I got to correct you there. 'l'he 
nine men involved were men 'vho have assign-
Inents to g·o to work at 5 :45 in the morning in 
order to transport men in coaches to and from 
their respective places of work. Therefore, by 
going to work that early in the morning, they 
did 11ot even know a strike was in progress, they 
did not see anyone, a picket sign or anything, 
therefore, they did render service to the company 
for that day." 
'festimony of :Nir. Dispenza (R 0099): 
Question: "Did any of your group go through 
the lines and report to work? 
Ar1swer: ''Well, I think on the first day, I 
think there 'vere a few.'' 
In answer to a question as to whether or not he had 
been contacted by the con1pany for arrangements for 
Inen to go to 'vork at the precipitation plant on or 
about the time of the strike, Mr. Dispenza replied (R 
0099) : 
Ans,ver: "Subsequent to that time. If I might 
add, the only conversation on the day of the 
strike was ''rith regards to the water switchers 
and this was a-I went to the company and I 
said as mayor of the town I was very interested 
in seeing that our people received water. They 
furnish us "'ater, and I asked the company rep-
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
resentatives if arrangements had been made for 
the water S\vitchers to go to work, which has 
been the practice at all times in the case of a 
strike. ,-l,he company said that they had not made 
any arrange1nents to get passes for those people 
and they weren't going to ask for any. However, 
if I \vanted to ask them as mayor of the town 
that I could and I did this and I went to the 
IBE \V and asked them as a spokesman of the 
city if they would allow these people to go to 
work so that we could have culinary water, 
which they did. At a later date the company, 
somebody in the company, I don't remember if 
it was Mr. Peterson or who it was, but he asked 
me if I would ask the IBE\V for passes for the 
P .P. Plant workers to go to work. I told them 
that in the past it was always the-between the 
company and the striking unit to furnish the 
passes or 'vho they would furnish the passes to. 
I have made mention to the company that if-I 
asked the company rather-if they wanted the 
guys to go to 'vork at the plant. They said they 
did. Then I mentioned to the company that it 
should be their place, not mine, to go down and 
ask for passes for those people." 
Testimony of ~.Ir. Kerr (witness for the Depart-
ment) (R 0101): 
Question: "'V ait just a moment. There were 
n1ore than nine reported for work? 
Ans,ver: "Yes, quite a few. 
Question: ''They "'"ere given assignments? 
Ans"'er: "As soon as they "\\rere given assign-
Inents. they left the property. There were others 
on the property. 
10 
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Question: "\ \rhy ~ Did they say 'vhy 1 
Aus,ver: "I don't have their reasons why. 
Question: "Now. what were their work assign-
ments ? Were they in their regular classifica-
tion? 
Answer: "Y.es." 
,.fhe findings that regularly scheduled ,\~ork was 
available to the appellants are substantially supported 
by the evidence. 
,.l,he appellants argue that they failed to report 
for work because the co1npany did not have work for 
them due to the fact that the electrical workers were 
on strike. Most of the witnesses for the appellants testi-
fied that in their opinion the company could not operate 
,,~ithout the members of the IBEW and that there was 
no work for them. As we shall see from the following 
testimony, however, some of these same witnesses also 
testified that they could have worked at least for a 
day or two. At no time prior to the strike did the com-
pany commit any overt act or make any announcement 
\vhich would indicate to the appellants that in the event 
of a strike the plant would be closed. To the contrary, 
the evidence supports the findings that work was avail-
able. Only after the 7:00 o'clock A.M. shift failed to 
report for 'vork as scheduled were any of the appellants 
informed that the con1pany could not operate as usual. 
In the absence of an overt act on the part of the 
company "Thich would lead appellants to believe that 
effective "~ith the comn1encement of the strike the com-
11 
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pany would cease operations, we contend that the events 
following the appellants' refusal to report for work 
are not of particular importance. We hereafter set 
forth some of the testi1nony to support the findings that 
work was available and that no such overt act was com-
mitted. 
Testifying for the appellants, Mr. Bentley, an 
officer of the IBE,V, said (R 0058): 
"We have an open shop agreement." 
And later at R 0066 Mr. Bentley testifies: 
"Well, we were well aware of the fact that 
when we 'vent on strike that we were pitting our 
strength against Kennecott's strength. In other 
words, we were gambling. We 'vere taking the 
calculated risk which we thought was a good 
risk that Kennecott would not be able to func-
tion without us. We realize that if they were 
able to replace us that they had the legal rights 
to go out and hire 200 official people to take our 
jobs, but 've realized that due to the fact of the 
key positions that we held that Kennecott would 
not be able to operate without us. For that rea-
son it "rould haYe been foolish for us to have 
went on strike if we weren't relatively certain 
that Kennecott "rould not be able to operate 
"th t " WI OU US .•• 
Mr. Kerr. n1ine operations superintendent, testified 
in cross-examination ( R 0110) dealing with the question 
as to 'vhether or not normal operations require the 200 
electricians and said: 
"''r elL if \Ye 'vere without that group, we have 
as you "·ell kno\\·. our supervisory force. ''T e 
12 
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also have the prerogative to contract out as 1nuch 
of this work as we please to maintain as near 
norn1al operation as we can, and we also n1ay, if 
we have to, hire to replace that organizatioil. 
Question: "But you did none of these things 
here except for the amount of some 'vork that 
you contract out. 
Ans\ver: "We contracted some out, yes. 
Question: "Now during the period of this 
strike-let's get at it another 'vay. You don't 
contend that normal operations could have been 
conducted with the 26 supervisors and the work 
that you contracted out. 
Answer: "I won't contend one 'vay or the 
other. All I can say is that it was our intention 
to maintain as near normal as we could. 
Question: "What is your opinion as to ho\\' 
near nortnal you could come with those 26 super-
visors? 
Ans"rer: "Well, we would have had to have 
been in the actual circumstances to be able to 
know, but my instrtictions from the management 
and my instructions to my supervisors 'vere that 
we were going to maintain operations as best ,,.e 
could with whatever help we could get. And if 
we got a normal work force we'd have done our 
best to maintain as near normal operation as 've 
could have, utilizing the three prerogatives that 
I just mentioned." 
On direct examination of Mr. Kerr (R 0101): 
Question: "Was there any production 'vork 
done on the 17th? 
Answer: "Yes, there was. 'Vhen I got through 
13 
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making· assignments to those individuals 'vho 
were on the property and reported for ~rork, "re 
had enough left over that extended work as-
signments to operate ore shovels and, I belie,ye, 
seven trains.'' 
Question: '''l'hen no men sho,ved up for work. 
that you didn't provide work for? 
Answer: '".fhat's true." 
Mr. Kerr had previously testified supra that there 
were others who reported for work but when they were 
given assignments turned them down and left the job. 
At R 0103: 
Question: "'Vas all necessary electrical "·ork 
in view of the absence of actual operation crews 
done which could be done? 
Answer: "'Yes." 
In light of the appellants' contention that no work 
was available to them, let us examine the testimony of 
appellants' witness, l\ir. Dispenza, a member of the 
International Association of Mine, ~Iill and S1nelter 
Workers Local 485 ..... ~t R 0097 on direct examination: 
Question: "Ho"r many men are covered by 
your contract of employment? 
Answer: "Between 1100 and 1200, I believe." 
Question: "If the--can the tnine operate or 
function in the event that the electricians or any 
g'roup are not aYnilable for work? 
Ans,ver: "C~an it function? 
(~uestion: "Yes. 
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Answer: "For a short period of ti1ne it could. 
Not for very long. 
Question: ''Hovt" long would you say~ 
Ans"\ver: ''A matter of a couple of days." 
1,he Referee and the Board of Revie'v g·ave cre-
dence to the testimony of ~lr. Kerr, the superintendent, 
that had the workers represented by .:\lr. Dispenza 
reported for work then the necessary electrical \vork 
would have been performed first by the use of the 
supervisors and then by contracting "\Vork out and hiring 
replacements for the members of the IBE\V. Qb,,iously 
the appellants by refusing to make themselves available 
for work were unwilling to put the matter of the com-
pany's ability to replace the electrical workers to an 
actual test. Instead, they preferred to support the strike 
of the electrical workers and then argue that the only 
reason they were not reporting to work was because 
work was not available. Certainly if such was their be-
lief they would have 'vorked the one or two days and 
then if the company had been unable to acco1nplish the 
electrical work as was necessary, their unemployment 
would actually have been then due to the fact that 'vork 
was not available. In addition, working for the extra 
days would certainly have enabled the mill and smelter 
to continue working for an additional period of time 
before they ran 011t of ore. We call your attention to the 
testimony of the appellants' witness, Weidner, 'vho 
testified that he worked on the records of the precipita-
tion plant and respectfully call the Court's attention 
that the evidence in the record shows that the precipi-
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· tation plant operated during the strike. Mr. '\r eidner's 
work, therefore, as a matter of fact, continued but he 
was not available to do it. 
Mr. Gaythwaite, a locomotive engineer, testifying 
for the appellants on cross-examination at R 0089: 
Question: ''As a matter of fact, some of the 
locomotives were operated during this strike, 
were they not? 
Answer: ''Correct. 
Question: "That meant the power was on. 
Answer: "Correct. 
Question: ''It also meant, too, didn't it, that 
the Central Traffic Control System was operat-
ing1 
Answer: "By a supervisor, correct. 
Question: "By a supervisor. Now after, did 
any of the members of your local work after 7 
a.m. on August 171 
Answer: "Yes. 
Question: "There were about nine that "rorked 
one or two days. 
Answer: "One day, I think. 
Question: ''Now these locomotives that you 
operate, they don't break down all at one time 
would they·~ As a 1natter of fact, they might not 
break down on any particular day. Isn't that 
true? 
Answer: "'fhat's true, that's true. 
Question: ~'They n1ight run one day or t'Yo 
days. 
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Answer: "'They n1ight run a week or t\vo 
weeks.'' 
'I'his \vas a strike by a maintenance group-only 
about 150 of 200 workers involved \vere doing skilled 
\vork. 'l"he company, according to the record, decidetl 
that it could repla~e them by the use of supervisors, ne"· 
hires, and by the contracting of electrical work to con-
cerns outside the plant. 
The history of business is replete with instances 
where there are strikes of maintenance units or small 
production units and no \vork stoppages result inas-
much as the striking workers are replaced as is legally 
pern1issible under existing labor laws. 
The preponderance of the testimony supports the 
findings that it was the nonavailability of the appel-
lants for work rather than the nonavailability of work 
for the appellants which was the direct and impelling 
cause of the work stoppage. The Comrnission and the 
Board of Review drew the proper inferences from the 
evidence and testimo11y. In the case of Ashwell vs. 
United States Seat Company, 167 S."W". 2d 950, 952, 
the Court said : 
" ... If from the testimony two different con-
clusions may be drawn as to the ultimate fact at 
issue,. each of such conclusions or inferences be-
ing consistent \vith the testimony and each in-
consistent with the other, it remains for the 
triers of fact to dra'v the inference and it does 
not become a question of law ... '' 
17 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUl\1ENT 
POIN'l' TWO 
2. THE CLAIMANTS REPRESENTED Blr 
THE SUBJEC.T LOCAL UNIONS P ARTICI-
PATED IN 'l'HE S'fRIKE OF ~rHE ELECTRI-
CAL WORKERS UNION OF AUGUST 17, 
1961, BY CONCERTED WITHHOLDING OF 
'fHEIR SERVICES. 
POIN'l' 'l"'HR.EE 
3. THE UNElVIPLOYl\1EN'l"' OF T H E 
CLAIMANTS WAS DUE TO A STOPPAGE 
OF WORI{ WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE Ol., 
A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE, 
CLASS, OR GROUP OF "\tVORKERS AT THE 
MINE. 
Because the separation of the argument on defend-
ants' points of argun1ents 2 and 3 would necessarily 
lead to a considerable duplication of discussion and 
citations, we are presenting a single argument on the 
two points. 
Section 35-4-5 (d)~ l_:tah Code Annotated 1953, 
provides: 
~'An individual shall be ineligible for benefits 
or for purposes of establishing a "·aiting period: 
" (d) For any 'veek in "·hich it is found by the 
c.onunission that his uneinploytnent is due to a 
stoppage of 'vork 'vhich exists because of a strike 
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involving his grade, class, or group of \vorkers 
at the factory or establishment at which he is or 
was last employed." 
,.l"o a considerable extent the facts in the instant 
case correspond to those in the case of Gus P. Lexe:;, 
et al Ys. Industrial Commission of Utah, 243 IJ. 2d 96J, 
121 Utah 551. In that case the S"ritchmen's l'" nion of 
North America established picket lines at the gates 
of the American Smelting & Refining Company plant 
and the morning shift of the American Smelting & 
Refining Company employees upon encountering the 
pickets standing outside the plant did not report 
for available 'vork. No dispute of any kind existed 
between the Smelting Company and its employees 
either as to wages or any condition of employment. 
This Court voted with approval the language of a deci-
sion by the Oregon Appeals Referee in case No. 46-
RA-144, quoted at paragraph 8059 of CCH Unem-
ployment Insurance Service which held that even 
though claimant is not a member of a striking union, 
he expresses interest and participation in the dispute 
which creates his unemployment b~r his refusal to cross 
the picket line at the factory or establishment where he 
was last employed. 
Justice Crockett in his decision which concurred 
in the result stated: 
"Although the inquiry did not proceed upon 
the theory that claimants engaged in the strike, 
the undisputed facts show that this was the case. 
Neither the fact that there 'vas no dispute \vith 
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the employer, nor that their work stoppage was 
not called a strike, are controlling. A strike is 
generally defined to be a concerted action of 
employees in withholding services from their 
employer. Any such concerted action in refusing 
to perform services is a strike, no matter what 
the action may be called, nor for whatever pur-
pose it may have been initiated. 
" . . . 'fhere is no theory under which such 
concerted action in refusing to work can be in-
terpreted and classified as anything other than 
a strike. The Legislature has expressly provided 
in Section 5 (d) herein-above referred to that 
under such circumstances unemployment benefits 
shall not be awarded. The wisdom and purpose 
of that provision is not our present concern. 
"It will be noted that the determination made 
in the case of Bodinson Mfg. Co. v. Calif. Emp. 
Comm., 17 Cal. 2d 321, 109 P. 2d 921, 935, cited 
in the n1ain opinion, was grounded on the fact 
that clai1nants left their work because of a trade 
dispute. 'l"'he court said: 'Fairly interpreted it 
[the statute] disqualified those workers who vol-
untarily leave their work because of a trade dis-
pute. Co-respondents in this proceeding, in fact, 
left their 'vork because of a trade dispute and 
are consequentlr ineligible to 1·eceive payments.' 
In American Brake Shoe Company v. Frank 
Annunzio, etc., 405 Ill. 44, claimants who did 
not cross a picket line set up by members of an-
other union "·ere held disqualified, the courts 
saying, ' ... that they were either participating 
in the labor dispute ... or voluntarily a'vay from 
their employment . . . ' The statutes of both 
Cn.Iifornin and Illinois include the term 'trade 
dispute· "·ith 'strike' ns a disqualification. Note 
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also the Oregon Appeals Referee case referred 
to in the prevailing opinion 'vhich states clearly 
that the basis of the holding is that the claitnant 
honoring the picket line is participating in the 
dispute. It is submitted that most of the cases 
cited by defendants are actually decided on that 
ground, "rhich as I have attempted to demon-
strate, is the logical basis upon which the a\\·ard 
is denied.'' 
In the case of Olof Nelson Construction Cotnpany, 
'!incent-Peterson Construction Con1pany, Gronen1an 
& Company, Young & Smith Construction Co1npany, 
Utah Construction Company vs. 'l,he Industrial Com-
mission of Utah and the Board of Revie,Y, r\ppeals 
Referee and Claims Supervisor of its Department of 
Employment Security, 243 P. 2d 951, 121 Utah 525, 
this Court said: 
" ... ':Vhose conduct is really responsible for 
the work stoppage 1 Answering this question may 
have its difficulties but it seems to be the only 
logical means of getting at the heart of the matter 
and resolving the conflict." 
The Court continued: 
"I think that principle is sound and should be 
squarely approved by us so that both labor and 
management 'viii kno'v that he who first resorts 
to the use of work stoppage as a means of putting 
on economic pressure to settle a dispute will be 
chargeable with the responsibility of haYing done 
so. 
"Thus the critical fact to be determined is 
,vhether the conduct of labor or management is 
the primary and initiating cause of the 'vork 
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stoppage, or as phrased by Mr. Justice Schauer 
in the McKinley case: ' ... It was proper to 
relate responsibility for the work stoppage to 
the party who created its actual and directly im-
pelling cause.' " .. 
We have canvassed the leading cases in the unein-
ployment co1npensation field 'vhich deal with situations 
similar to the one we have in this case. 'Ve feel 
that most of the cases place undue e1nphasis on the 
matter of the benefit claimants failing to appear for 
work because of the existence of a picket line. As 
pointed out by the witness, Bentley, supra, "A picket 
line advertises that you're on strike and we'd like every-
body to abide by it." The picket line becomes, therefore, 
a formal request for support of the strike by nonstriking 
workers and not a barrier to reporting for work. Union 
principles require that support. 'Ve quote briefly from 
each case. we firmly believe, however, that for the 
purposes of disqualifying claimants who refused to 
report for work "\Vhen another union is on strike, it is 
not necessarily important that we identify the primary 
reason for their withholding of their services. ''r e are 
n1ore concerned 'vith the fact that claimants do with-
hold their services than \Ye ~re "rith the basic underlying 
reason for such '"ithholding ,, .. hen the employer makes 
work available. 
In the case of Bro\vn vs. l\Iaryland Unemployment 
Co1npensntion ]~oard, .. '55 A. 2d 696, 701, the Court said: 
~'If the clain1ant participated in the strike at 
all by refnsing to cross the picket line for one or 
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two days \vhen \York \Vas available, they parti-
cipated in the strike for its entire duration ... 
and refusal to cross the picket line being a volun-
tary act . . . they must accept the consequences 
of that refusal." 
In the case of Myer vs. Industrial Commission of 
~Iissouri, 223 S.\V. 2d 835, the Court concluded that 
an employee who voluntarily refuses to cross a picket 
line to go to work is participating in a stoppage of \Vork 
within the meaning of the unemployment compensation 
law so as to be precluded from obtaining benefits there-
under regardless of the fact that he 1nay not profit from 
the strike. See also Urbach vs. Board of Review, 83 
A. 2d 392. 
In the case of Lloyd E. Mitchell, Inc. vs. Mary-
land E1nployment Security Board, 121 A. 2d 198, the 
Court said: 
"It is well settled that a voluntary failure or 
refusal by workers, members of a nonstriking 
union, to pass through a picket line established 
by members of another union at the place of 
employment, constitutes participation in the la-
bor dispute. Bro,vn vs. Maryland Unemploy-
ment Compensation Board, 189 Md. 233, 243, 
and cases cited. This rule is in accord with the 
great weight of authority. 
"See also Dante J. Cottini, et al, Appellees 
vs. Roy F. Cummins, Director of Labor, 8 Ill. 
2d 135, 133 N.~~. 2d 263. See also McGann vs. 
Board of Review, 163 Pa. super 379, 62 A. 2d 
87." 
In the case of Bodinson jlanufacturing Company 
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vs. California Employ1nent C.ommission, 17 Cal. 2d 
321, 109 P. 2d 935, a strike was called by the welders' 
union. Machinists in the same plant who did not go on 
strike, refused to pass through the picket line which 
the striking welders had established around the plant. 
The Court said: 
'' I11 brief, disqualification under the Act de-
pends upon the fact of voluntary action and not 
the motives which lead to it. The Legislature 
did not seek to interfere with union principles 
or practices. rl"he A.ct merely sets up certain con-
ditions as a prerequisite to receive compensation 
and declares that in certain situations the worker 
shall be ineligible to receive compensation. Fairly 
interpreted, it \Vas intended to disqualify those 
workers who voluntarily leave their work because 
of a trade dispute. Correspondents in these pro-
ceedings, in fact, left their work because of a 
trade dispute and are consequently ineligible to 
receive benefit payments." " 
In the case of Alnerican Brake Shoe Company vs. 
}-,rank Annunzio, etc.~ 405 Ill. 44, 90 N.E. 2d 83 to 
84 referred to by Justice Crockett in the Lexes case 
supra, the Court stated: 
"This case presents squarely for determination 
the question of whether the failure to cross a 
picket line established by· other employees of the 
same e1nployer precludes employees who fail to 
cross the picket line from unemployment com-
pensation benefits "\\7hen those employees are 
members of an entirel~r different labor organi-
zation and ha,,.e no interest in or connection with 
the labor dispute resulting in the picketing of the 
employer's establishment." 
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At page 85 the Court said: 
"In this case it appears that the die sinkers 
could have entered their place of employ1nent 
'vithout sustai11ing bodily harm and this Court 
will not assume that picketing will normally 
bring violence; therefore, it appears to us that 
the die sinkers voluntarily remained a\Yay fro1n 
their employment because they did not care to 
be classified as 'scabs' by fellow employees, since 
the fear of such classification appears to be their 
motivation for their failure to cross the picket 
line or voluntarily remaining away from their 
employment, either of which 'vould disqualify 
them from compensation benefits. The die sink-
ers are unemployed solely because in accordance 
with their union principles they did not choose 
to work in a plant wb_ere certain employees from 
another plant of their employer were conducting 
picketing.'' 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant case, most of the workers who testi-
fied stated that they approached the entrances to the 
mine, that they observed picket lines and traffic jams 
and turned around and went home. The evidence over-
whelmingly shows that the claimants chose to involve 
themselves in the strike by withholding their services, 
even to the extent of walking off the job after they had 
been given their regular work assignments. It is our 
position that regardless of the reason which formed the 
basis for the appellants' withholding of their services 
they involved themselves In a strike "·hen they failed 
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to perform their regular available work. 'I'he fact of 
the matter is that those fe,v who did report and who 
remained to work did work on their regular assignments 
in a plant where operations were below normal for the 
reason that the appellants refused to make themselves 
available for work. The appellants were involved in the 
strike which caused the work stoppage and were prop-
erly held to be ineligible for unemployment compensa-
tion benefits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATrr KESLER 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREl\1"""L\_NN 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
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